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Abstract
Previous empirical evidence on municipal e¢ciency mostly uses cross-sectional data which
makes it impossible to separate unobserved heterogeneity from ine¢ciency. Furthermore, they
also typically use a two-stage approach which has been widely criticized as the assumptions in
the rst stage are violated in the second stage, generating biased results. We contribute to the
literature by putting forward a one stage approach with parametric models and panel data to
estimate municipal e¢ciency of 324 Chilean municipalities for the period 2008-2018. We take
into account observed and unobserved heterogeneity, incorporating them both into the frontier
and jointly estimating e¢ciency of all the municipalities in the sample. Our results suggest
that Chilean municipalities have a relevant degree of ine¢ciency as they could achieve the same
provision of services with 53% -61% less resources, depending on the specication, and that
there is large heterogeneity in their level of e¢ciency. Finally, we also nd that municipalities
with a high dependency on the Municipal Common Fund are less e¢cient supporting the notion
of local governments scal laziness present in the literature.
Keywords: E¢ciency, Local governments, Panel Data, Parametric Estimation, Chile.
JEL Classication: H71, H72, H83, D24, O54
1 Introduction
Local governments (municipalities) are a crucial factor when politicians pursue a decentralized
system of policy making. This is because they are the closest political level to the population and
their needs. Due to this, they have their own budgets and are in general mandated to provide a
number of services to their community.
Given their relevance, there have been a long series of studies which tried to measure the level
of e¢ciency on municipal provision of public services. Traditionally, previous literature have used
a two stages approach, a rst stage to estimate ine¢ciency and a second stage to estimate the
determinants that a¤ect the previously estimated ine¢ciency. This two-stages approach has been
widely criticized (Wang and Schmidt, 2002) because the assumptions in the second stage contradicts
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those made in the rst stage, potentially biasing the results. In particular, in the rst stage it is
assumed that the ine¢ciency term is independent and identically distributed while in the second
step ine¢ciency is deterministic. Thus, a one stage approach has been suggested to solve the
drawbacks of the two stage approach.
Additionally, the vast majority of previous literature uses a cross-section approach. This has
the drawback that it is not possible to separately identify ine¢ciency from municipal unobserved
heterogeneity. In order to overcome this di¢culty, models with panel data have been suggested.
Recent literature have used panel data for municipal e¢ciency estimation. Unfortunately, the vast
majority of recent previous literature have used non-parametric methods which uses a two stage
approach to estimate ine¢ciency and their determinants (Greene, 2005c). Apart from this, they face
other drawbacks. In particular, non-parametric methods uses linear programing techniques instead
of econometric methods which implies that the error is calculated and not estimated. This in turn
implies that non-parametric techniques have a deterministic nature. In this way, any deviation
from the frontier is interpreted as ine¢ciency even though the source of these deviations may be
due to variables that are not under the control of the municipality. Furthermore, with availability
of panel data, non-parametric methods have an additional drawback. As non-parametric methods
optimize period by period, e¢ciency score is computed for each single year as just in a cross-sectional
framework, therefore they ignore the panel dimension of the data.
Moreover, most parametric evidence uses cross sectional data, which does not allow to disen-
tangle municipal e¢ciency from municipal unobserved heterogeneity (see Greene 2005a, 2005b and
2005c). In addition, as municipalities can be very heterogeneous in kind, observed heterogeneity
should also be taken into account in the analysis. If the issue of observed heterogeneity is not
adequately considered in the analysis, which may be due to omitted variables, the model can be
misspecied and therefore the estimates can be biased and inconsistent. Some authors have sug-
gested a separate analysis based on the use of clusters of municipalities, to deal with this issue
(Afonso and Fernandez, 2008). Unlike them, we propose an alternative methodology that allows us
to control by heterogeneity incorporating it into the frontier and jointly estimate all the municipal-
ities in the sample. In particular, we take observed heterogeneity into account by including those
e¤ects in the mean of the distribution of ine¢ciency as suggested by Kopsakangas-Savolainen and
Svento (2011), who study the electricity distribution industry.
To our knowledge this is the rst attempt to use a one stage approach with parametric models
and panel data to estimate municipal e¢ciency, taking into account observed and unobserved het-
erogeneity in local governments stochastic frontier models. In particular, we present an e¢ciency
analysis of 324 Chilean municipalities for the period 2008-2018. For this task we use adminis-
trative data provided by the Chilean Government on the municipal provision of a series of services
(SINIM). Our results suggest that Chilean municipalities present on average ine¢ciency levels of
61% approximately for the period 2008-2018. In other words, Chilean municipalities could provide
the same amount of services but with a 61% less of resources. We also report the evolution of
average e¢ciency for the period 2008-2018 showing that the levels of aggregated ine¢ciency have
sharply risen during this period, from 37,5% to 78,4%. We also nd that regional or provincial
capitals are more e¢cient on average than the rest of municipalities of the same region. Further-
more, we also nd evidence that municipalities with a high dependency on the Municipal Common
Fund (as percentage to self-generated income) and with a high percentage of public investment
with respect to total expenditure are, ceteris paribus, less e¢cient. Also, we nd that local govern-
ments with higher self-generated revenues coming from higher territorial taxes collected or higher
municipal commercial rights are more e¢cient. Finally, we nd that current transfers from public
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institutions (namely, Ministries and other public services) to municipalities also increase e¢ciency.
This study is organized as follows: section 2 provides the institutional framework of municipal
management. Section 3 presents the details of the methodology used in this work. Section 4 puts
forward the data and the summary statistics. Section 5 and 6 present the results and the sensitivity
analysis respectively. Finally, section 7 o¤ers some concluding remarks and policy recommendations.
2 Institutional Framework
Chile is organized in 15 regions.1 Each of them has provinces (54 in total) and each of the provinces
has municipalities (345 in total). The Organic Law of Municipalities (Law No18,695) establishes
how municipalities are constituted (i.e. the Major and the City Council), how their authorities
are elected and their attributions. The major has two main attributions: (i) those related with
municipal management and (ii) those attributed to the municipality as an institution. Among the
former, the major has to be the legal responsible individual in judicial and extra-judicial cases and
also he/she is the responsible for the municipal budget. On the other hand, the city council is in
charge of scalization and enhancement of community participation.
2.1 Specic functions of the local government
The Organic Law of Municipalities (Law No18,695) establishes that the local government has 6 ex-
clusive responsibilities and 13 shared with other institutions. Among the former are: the planning
and management of the development communal plan (PLADECO), promotion of community de-
velopment, public transport regulation, hygiene services, urbanism and construction norms. Among
the shared responsibilities are those which attributes to municipalities the main responsibility for
education and health at the local government area.
Regarding nancial matters, article 13o of the Organic Law of Municipalities (Law No18,695)
establishes the main source of municipal assets, among which are:
 All real state goods they acquire
 Transfers from the regional government
 Resources from the municipal common fund (FCM).
 Benets obtained from the services they deliver and for any concession (rights) or permits
they give.
 Income received as a result of their activities and activities in related dependencies.
 Income collected from all the taxes the law allows local government to charge. Among these
are: territorial tax, transport tax and commercial rights on alcoholic sells.
 Interests and penalties.
1Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá, Antofagasta, Atacama, Coquimbo, Valparaíso, Región Metropolitana, del
Libertador Bernardo OHiggins, Maule, Bío-Bío, Araucanía, de Los Ríos, de Los Lagos, Aysén and Carlos Ibañez del
Campo and Magallanes and Chilean Antartica.
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Municipal income can be classied depending on the source of funding. There are two main
funding sources: permanent self-generated revenues (Ingresos Propios Permanentes, IPP) and mu-
nicipal common fund (Fondo Común Municipal, FCM ). Other sources are transfers from regional
government and the central government. Among the latter are transfers for education and health
services. In this way, local government act as an intermediary between local education and health
services and the respective ministry. Next, we present the detail of the income sources of the
municipal budget coming from non-conditional transfers of the central government (education and
health), i.e. municipal common fund (FCM ) and permanent self-generated revenues (IPP).
2.1.1 Municipal Common Fund (FCM)
The Municipal common fund is a fund created by the local government reform in 1979. The
objective is to redistribute communal income in order to guarantee the achievement of municipal
functions and its adequate functioning. In this way, the sources of funding of the FCM come
from municipal income and are dened by article 14o of the Organic Law of Municipalities (Law
No18,695) in the way presented in Table 1.
Regarding the mechanism of distribution of this fund, there is a dened structure which allocate
the resources. The mechanism of distribution can be observed in Table 2. In this way, the
rst 25% corresponds to the amount transferred to be distributed in the same proportion in all the
municipalities in the country. The next 10% is distributed depending on poverty levels (i.e. number
of poor people relative to poor people in the country). The next 30% is distributed according to the
number of assets exempt of territorial tax relative to the total of exempts asset (regarding territorial
tax only) in the country. Finally, the last 35% is transferred to those municipalities which generate
lower permanent self-generated revenue (IPP) per capita than the national average.
2.1.2 Permanent self-generated revenues (IPP)
Permanent self-generated revenues (IPP) is the source of funds a local government generates from
municipal management. Income generated from this source has no restriction on where or in what
to invest. From article 38 of the municipal rents law No3,063, IPP are composed by: municipal
rights income, hygiene rights, concessions, municipal property rents, percentage of the income from
territorial tax and transport tax, among others. From these sources most of the income of IPP
comes from: territorial tax, commercial rights and transport tax. The rst one is a tax imposed
to agricultural and non-agricultural land.2 From this source of income, only 40% remains in the
municipality for its own funding and the other 60% is directed to the municipal common fund
(FCM ).3
Commercial rights are regulated mainly by the municipality as it chooses the tax rate to charge
(subject to a range established by the law). Of the amount of income collected by commercial rights,
only the richest four municipalities (Santiago, Providencia, Las Condes and Vitacura) transfer a
proportion to the FCM: Santiago 55% and the other three 65%. Finally, regarding transport tax,
from the amount collected the 37.5% goes for municipal benet and the rest (64.5%) go to the
FCM.
2This is regulated in the Law No17,235 about territorial tax.
3For the four richest municipalities, Santiago, Providencia, Las Condes and Vitacura percentage are: 35% and
65% respectively.
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3 Literature Review4
3.1 Parametric versus Non-Parametric approaches
In order to measure e¢ciency two types of approaches have been used: non-parametric (such as Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH)) and parametric (such as Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA)). On the one hand, the non-parametric approach analyzes e¢ciency from
the data available and not from imposed functional forms. Also, it uses linear programing techniques
instead of econometric methods which makes that the error is calculated and not estimated implying
that non-parametric techniques have a deterministic nature. In this way, any deviation from the
frontier is interpreted as ine¢ciency even though the source of these deviations may be due to
variables that are not under the control of the municipality. Also, non-parametric methods use two
stages procedures, which have been criticized because of the contradictions between the assumptions
made in the rst stage versus to what is estimated in the second stage. Furthermore, with availability
of panel data, non-parametric methods have an additional drawback. As non-parametric methods
optimize period by period, e¢ciency score is computed for each single year as just in a cross-sectional
framework, therefore they ignore the panel dimension of the data.
Parametric methods, such as the stochastic frontier analysis, originally developed by Aigner,
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van Broeck (1977), come from an extension of Or-
dinary Least Squares (OLS) and Maximum Likelihood (ML). In this way, while OLS estimate the
most appropriate function of medium cost, the stochastic frontier analysis estimates the maximum
production or the minimum cost. Furthermore, it decomposes the deviation from the frontier in
to a random component (the error term) and the ine¢ciency. In this way, this approach can ac-
commodate exogenous shocks such as bad weather and separate it from ine¢ciency. An additional
advantage of parametric methods is that, when there is panel data, they take into account the
unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities, which could play a crucial role in explaining the
performance of cities.5 The drawback of parametric methods is the necessity of an assumption
about the production (or cost) function. As, in this study, we use the parametric approach, we
tackle its weakness by assuming di¤erent production (cost) functions in order to check if results are
sensitive to them.
3.2 Empirical Evidence on Municipal E¢ciency6
The analysis of municipal e¢ciency has been carried out mainly in two steps models: the rst one as
an e¢ciency analysis itself and the second as an evaluation of its determinants (see Ballaguer-Coll
et al. (2002), Herrera and Francke (2009), Afonso and Fernandes (2006)).
In this way, in the rst step the focus has been placed on the analysis of the productive process
by which the local government utilize the available resources to generate goods and services; As
such, municipal performance has been measured by the e¢ciency of municipal expenditure. The
results obtained in previous literature, which focused in municipal e¢ciency, suggests that there are
important ine¢ciencies on municipal expenditure. For example, the Afonso and Fernandez (2006)
DEA study for Portugal concludes that on average municipalities of the Lisbon region could achieve
the same performance with 39% less resources. Similarly, a second DEA evaluation applied to 278
4For a systematic literature review on the Local governments e¢ciency see: Narbón-Perpiñá & De Witte (2018)
and Aiello and Bonanno (2019).
5Parametric methods estimate the time prole of the scores endogenously in a single panel.
6For a systematic literature review on the Local governments e¢ciency see Narbón-Perpiñá & De Witte (2018).
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Portuguese municipalities showed similar ine¢ciency levels (Afonso and Fernandez 2008). For Peru,
the parametric cross-section analysis of Herrera and Francke (2009) showed that municipalities could
achieve the same provision of good and services with 58% less resources. In the same line, Pang, Liu,
Peng and Wu (2010) nd ine¢ciency levels of 41% for Taiwanese municipalities and Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2007) with a DEA and a FDH nd similar results for Spain.
Studies focused on the second stage, where the determinants of the ine¢ciency are estimated,
showed that for Belgium, De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) the level of education has positive e¤ects
on municipal e¢ciency while average income and the amount of transfers relative to local income
have negative e¤ects on municipal e¢ciency. Also for Belgium, Van den Eckaut et al. (1993) nd a
positive relationship between municipal e¢ciency and political composition of the City Council (i.e.
better results for municipalities with heterogeneous composition of the council versus those with a
more homogeneous composition). For Peru, Herrera and Francke (2009) nd that a higher participa-
tion in FONCOMUN (similar to the Chilean FCM ) has negative e¤ect on municipal e¢ciency while
political participation a¤ects positively municipal e¢ciency. The parametric and non-parametric
evaluation of Greek municipalities by Anthanassopoulos and Triantis (1998) nd a negative rela-
tionship between e¢ciency levels and the ratio of transfers over municipal total income, population
density and political a¢liation (measured as parties a¢liated to the central government). For Fin-
land, Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) nd a positive relationship between municipal e¢ciency and
certain age groups (mainly with individuals between 35-49 years old) and a negative relationship
with peripheric geographic location, high income levels, high population, transfers of good and
services from other municipalities and higher participation in municipal funds. For Taiwan, Pang,
Liu, Peng and Wu (2010) concluded that environmental policies adopted by municipalities were
crucial for municipal e¢ciency. Cordero et al (2017) apply time-dependent conditional frontier esti-
mators to assess the performance of the 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities for the 20092014
period. Following Mastromarco and Simar (2015) conditional nonparametric frontier analysis, they
found that the economic and demographic indicators included as contextual variables in their model
play an important role as inuencing the production set, although those e¤ects do not seem to vary
much over time. This evidence was corroborated after they conducted a second-stage nonparametric
regression of the conditional e¢ciency measures over those variables.
In one of the very few parametric studies with panel data, Bianchini (2010) evaluates the ef-
ciency of 100 Italian chief towns of Province in providing urban environmental quality during
1998-2007. She nds that, besides socioeconomic variables, those which explain di¤erent municipal
performance are the scal and political ones. The other known parametric panel data study has
been carried out for the Czech Republic by Stastna and Gregor (2011). They nd that popula-
tion size, distance to the regional center, share of university educated citizens, capital expenditure,
subsidies per capita and the share of self-generated revenues increase ine¢ciency.
Previous results from the literature, as those mentioned above, are based on a variety of esti-
mation methods. On the one hand, parametric methods have been used which assume a functional
form to model the relationship between the variables of input and output and on the other hand
non-parametric methods have been used, which assume that any deviation from the frontier are
due to ine¢ciency. Under this general setup, the stochastic frontier analysis is the main parametric
approach while the data envelopment analysis and the free disposal hull are the main approaches in
non-parametric methods. Due to the variety of techniques for the estimation of municipal e¢ciency,
there have been some studies which focuses on the analysis of the di¤erences of the results given
by the di¤erent techniques. As such, De Borger and Kerstens (1996a and 1996b) in Belgium and
Worthington (2000) and Worthington and Dollery (2000) in Australia explore the di¤erences of the
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results given for the same municipalities using parametric and non-parametric methods. Similarly,
Van den Eckaut et al. (1993) focused in the comparison of the results of DEA and FDH. All these
studies have shown that the result obtained about municipal e¢ciency is sensitive to the technique
used. However, despite the magnitude of e¢ciency changes from method to method, the general
results are very similar.
Furthermore, it is important to mention that all the parametric evidence uses cross sectional
data (except Bianchini (2010) and Stastna and Gregor (2011)). This is crucial as, this kind of
data, may be informative for e¢ciency measures but it has the drawback that it is not possible to
disentangle municipal e¢ciency from municipal heterogeneity (see Greene 2005a, 2005b and 2005c).
Bianchini (2010) and Stastna and Gregor (2011) have carried out an overall analysis. Some authors
(Afonso and Fernandez 2008) have criticized this as municipalities are very heterogeneous, which
may be due to omitted variables, generating in this way a misspecied model. Unlike them, who
suggest a separate analysis based on the use of clusters of municipalities, we propose an alternative
methodology that allows us to control by heterogeneity incorporating it into the frontier and jointly
estimate all the municipalities in the sample. In particular, we take observed heterogeneity into
account by including those e¤ects in the mean of the distribution of ine¢ciency as suggested by
Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento (2011), who study the electricity distribution industry.
For parametric models, the majority of the empirical evidence on technical e¢ciency mentioned
above uses a two step approach, where the second step estimates the determinants of the ine¢ciency
estimated in the rst step. This is carried out regressing the estimated ine¢ciency on exogenous
variables which may a¤ect municipal performance. This two step method has been widely criticized
in the literature because this method assumes that the exogenous variables included in the second
step are not correlated with the variables used to estimate the ine¢ciency in the rst step. The
reason for this is that in the rst step it is assumed that ine¢ciency is independent and identically
distributed but in the second step the assumption is that ine¢ciency is explained by exogenous
variables, which may be a contradiction. In other words, if the variables included in the second step
are not orthogonal to those included in the rst step, this method will obtain biased results (Wang
and Schmidt 2002). In this way, to increase the number of input, output or exogenous variables will
probably increase the probability of violating the assumption. This issue is particularly problematic
for two stage studies that employ non-parametric methods (Simar and Wilson 2007)7 .
To solve this problem in the parametric case Khumbhakar, Gosh and McGuckin (1991) proposed
a one step estimation method where determinants of ine¢ciency are estimated jointly with the
frontier given the appropriate assumptions about the error terms. This method of estimation solves
the inconsistency on the estimators due to the assumptions imposed on the ine¢ciency term. Exists
two options for this one step estimation. The rst one incorporates the exogenous determinants of
the ine¢ciency directly in to the production function (Battese and Coelli, 1992) and the second
one and more used in the literature, includes the exogenous determinants into the mean of the
ine¢ciency term (Battese and Coelli, 1995). Interpretation of results di¤er in each option. In
the former, the e¤ect of the determinants of the ine¢ciency term determines the position of the
production function whereas in the latter they are interpreted as the distance to the frontier. As
our objective is to analyze the determinants of municipal ine¢ciency, we use the Battese and Coelli
(1995) approach (i.e. we include the exogenous determinants into the mean of the ine¢ciency term),
all this carried out in one step in order to avoid the problems described above. Furthermore, in
7 In their own words:"A more serious problem in all of the two-stage studies that we have found arises from
the fact that DEA e¢ciency estimates are serially correlated. Consequently, standard approaches to inference are
invalid". Furthermore, the two stage approach is routine in the DEA literature (Greene 2005c).
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order to take into account municipalities observed heterogeneity in our stochastic frontier model,
we incorporate such specic e¤ects in the estimated distribution of ine¢ciency, specically in the
mean of the distribution of ine¢ciency (see Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento, 2011).
4 Methodology
4.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
The Stochastic Frontier Analysis was developed by Aigner, et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van
Broeck (1977) as a model to estimate production and/or cost frontiers. In general, the approach
followed in the literature, either production maximization or cost minimization, depends upon
the exogeneity of output and inputs variables. In particular, when inputs are considered more
exogenous than the product (i.e. that they do not fully depend on municipal management) product
maximization is used and viceversa. In order to choose, the institutional framework is crucial, and
given the Chilean institutional framework described above, where output is given by the law (i.e.
exogenous) and inputs depend on municipal management, a cost minimization approach is more
adequate for our analysis.
Greene (2005c) argues that cost ine¢ciency is a blend of the two sources technical and allocative.
Despite this complexity, there are several studies which analyze cost ine¢ciency because they allow
to include multiple inputs, which is not straightforward on the production side. It is important to
notice that any deviation from cost e¢ciency may come from two sources: input-oriented technical
ine¢ciency and allocative ine¢ciency. In order to estimate the latter, additional data should be
available, for example: the vector of inputs prices. If the additional data is not available it is only
possible to estimate the input-oriented technical ine¢ciency. As in the Chilean case, we do not
know all the inputs and their respective prices, we focus our attention in this study only on input-
oriented technical ine¢ciency. Throughout this study we will refer to the input-oriented technical
e¢ciency as cost e¢ciency.
Hence, Aigner, et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van Broeck (1977) input-oriented specication,
dene the minimum cost level for observation i needed to produce a good and services vector given
inputs prices (wi). In this way the model can be expressed as:
Ci = C(yi; wi; ) exp(vi + ui) (1)
i = 1; :::::; N with ui  0
where:
Ci is the observed (actual) cost or expenditure of municipality i
C(yi; wi; ) is the cost frontier of municipality i
yi is the output vector of municipality i
 is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
vi is an iid random variable
8 .This variable represents exogenous factors which are not controlled
by the municipality which a¤ect the cost level (e.g. weather, luck , regulation, etc.). ui is a random
8That is: this random variable is independent and identically distributed.
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variable which correspond to the ine¢ciency level in costs and its distribution will depend on the
assumptions made (explained below).
The parameters of this model are estimated by Maximum Likelihood, given suitable distri-
butional assumptions for the error term. Aigner, et al. (1977) assumed that vi has a normal
distribution and ui has either the half-normal or the exponential distribution. The main criticism
is that there is no a priory justication for the selection of any particular distributional form for
the ui . Since then, started a literature which have proposed more general distributional forms,
such as the truncated-normal (Stevenson 1980) and the two-parameter Gamma (Greene 1997).9
It is crucial to notice that deviations between the observed cost (Ci) and the frontier (C(yi; wi; ))
can come from two sources: technical ine¢ciency of the municipality (ui) or random shocks which
are not under the control of the municipality (vi). Both components are assumed to be independent
from each other. The stochastic frontier method consist on the estimation of the variation of (vi)
and (ui) in order to obtain evidence of the relative e¤ect of each of them on costs. Thus, given
input prices wi, and in order to reach certain output yi, the cost e¢ciency level of a municipality
(CE ) will be given by:
CEi =
C(yi; wi; ) exp(vi)
C(yi; wi; ) exp(vi + ui)
= exp( ui) (2)
when the value of equation (2) tends to 1, implies that municipality i is very e¢cient in terms
of costs because actual costs will be similar to the cost e¢cient level. On the other hand, CE<1
provides a measure of the gap between the minimum possible cost and the one observed. The
ine¢ciency term itself (ui) is not observable, therefore "i = vi+ ui must be used for the estimation
of equation (2). In order to do this, the estimation is carried out computing the expected value of
the ine¢ciency term component (ui) given the composite error term ("i). This is:
CEi = E [exp ( uij"i)] = E [exp ( uij(vi + ui))] (3)
In order to nd E [ uij"i] the conditional density function must be known, and this function is
dened by:
f (uij"i) = f(ui; "i)
f("i)
=
f(ui; (vi + ui))
f("i)
(4)
To estimate this, it is necessary to assume a probability distribution for both error components.
As it was previously mentioned, in all the models the vi is considered as independent and identically
9Truncated normal and the two-parameter Gamma were introduced because the Half-normal and exponential
distributions both have a mode at zero. This causes conditional technical ine¢ciency scores, specially in the neigh-
bourhood of zero that can involve articially high technical e¢ciency levels. The Truncated Normal is more exible
since the modal e¢ciency value can also be away from one, and for this reason in most empirical works it is preferred
relative to the Half Normal.
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distributed following a normal distribution (N
 
0; 2v

). Despite there are no consensus on which
distribution to assume for ui, the most used one in the empirical literature is the truncated-normal
(N +
 
; 2u

). The main reason for this is that this distribution allows us to estimate the deter-
minants of the ine¢ciency in one step, avoiding the problems presented above when a two stage
approach is carried out.
After both distributions are dened, their distributions functions should be obtained:
f (vi) =
1
v
p
2
exp
 v2
22v

(5)
f (ui) =
2
u
p
2
exp
 u2
22u

(6)
as the joint density function (f(ui; "i)) is unknown, the joint density function of both error term
components can be estimated (f(ui; vi)) and replaced it in the term vi = "i   ui. As ui and vi are
independent to each other, the joint density function corresponds to the product of the individual
density functions such as:
f(ui:vi) = f(ui) f(vi) =
2
2vu
exp
 u2
22u
  v
2
22v

(7)
by replacing v = "  u we obtain the joint density function of ui and "i:
f(ui:"i) =
2
2vu
exp
 u2
22u
  ("  u)
2
22v

(8)
Now, to nd the denominator of equation (4), we integrate equation (8) to get:
f("i) =
1Z
0
f(ui:"i)du =
2p
2

1  

 "


exp
 "2
22

(9)
where 2 = 2u + 
2
v and  =
u
v
and () is the cumulative distribution function of a standard
normal. Using this parametrization,  is the ratio of the variability coming from each of the variables
that conform the composite error term. Therefore, if 2u ! 0 (and thus  ! 0), it is the random
e¤ect the one that predominates relative to the ine¢ciency and thus the density function of the
composite error term tends to a normal. On the other hand, if 2u !1 (and thus !1) the gap
between the minimum cost and the actual cost will be mainly determined by the ine¢ciency (ui).
Finally, replacing equation (9) in to equation (4) we obtain the density function of u given ":
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f (uij"i) = f(ui; "i)
f("i)
=
1p
2

1     

exp (u  )2
22

(10)
where:
 =
 "2u
2
(11)
2 =
2u
2
v
2
(12)
From the above, we conclude that f (uij"i) is the density function of a variable that distributes
N +
 
; 2

:Once this distribution is known, and given that the value of cost ine¢ciency ui is not
observable, it is possible to use the expected value E(uij"i) as the estimator of the cost ine¢ciency
of each municipality.
E(uij"i) =  + 
2
4 

 
i


1  

 
i


3
5 (13)
where  () is the density function of a standard normal. Thus, the cost e¢ciency function for a
municipality is:
CEi = E [exp ( uij"i)] =
1  

   i


1  

 i

 exp i + 22

(14)
4.2 Determinants of Ine¢ciency
As it was previously mentioned, a branch of the stochastic frontier literature has incorporated a
second stage where the determinants of the ine¢ciency found in the rst stage are estimated. This
approach has been criticized by more recent literature (Wang and Schmidt, 2002) and a one stage
approach has been suggested which solves the drawbacks of the two stage approach.
In order to carry out this one stage approach, there are two alternatives: the rst one incorpo-
rates the determinants directly as regressors in the non-stochastic component of the cost frontier.
The second one, incorporates indirectly the determinants in the stochastic component, in particular
on the variable ui. Thus, in the rst approach, it is assumed that determinants a¤ect directly the
cost frontier by moving it. On the other hand, the second approach assumes that determinants
a¤ects the costs ine¢ciency levels. This latter approach was introduced in the literature by Battese
and Coelli (1995) and it allows to nd which are the determinants of the estimated ine¢ciency.
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Therefore, the interpretation of the results corresponds to the distance between the e¤ective costs
and the cost frontier.
There is no consensus in the literature on which of the previous alternatives is preferred (Greene
2005c). Due to this and given our objective of nding the determinants of the ine¢ciency, we use
the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach.
4.3 Estimation Method
When panel data is available, there are two main approaches for the estimation of frontier functions:
xed and random e¤ects. In order to choose the more appropriate method it is important to consider
the assumptions about the ine¢ciency term and the linearity of the production function. If the
production function is not linear, then the within estimator will be inconsistent as the di¤erence
with respect to the mean may not eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity, furthermore, in short
panels (as in our case) xed e¤ects su¤er of what is known as incidental parameter problem and
random e¤ects should be used. If the production function is linear, then in principle both methods
may be appropriate depending on the assumptions made on the ine¢ciency term.
When ine¢ciency term is time invariant the Fixed E¤ect and the Random E¤ect present prob-
lems as in both approaches ui carries both the ine¢ciency and, in addition, any time invariant
municipal specic heterogeneity. Additionally, for both approaches, the time invariance assumption
in long time series of data, is likely to be a particularly strong assumption.
For these reasons, recent literature have promoted models with a time varying ine¢ciency term.
Even in this context, xed e¤ects do not take into account time invariant covariates (which is our
ultimate interest in this study). Due to this, a random e¤ects model is preferred (see more details
in Appendix A, available upon request). This model can be expressed as:
ln(C(yit; )) = 0 +
RX
r=1
rln(yrit) +
1
2
RX
r=1
KX
k=1
kln(yrit)ln(ykit) +
JX
j=1
jxjt + vit + uit (15)
where C(yit; ) is the cost function of municipality i in period t. yit is the output of municipality
i in period t;  is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; We also include the variable
xt which are dummies that control for time. vit is a white noise which is assumed independent
and identically distributed (iid) N
 
0; 2v

and independent of uit. uit represents the non negative
ine¢ciency term which may vary over time and distributed as truncated-normal (N +
 
zit; 
2
u

).
This is:
uit = z
0
it +Wit (16)
where zit are the determinants of the ine¢ciency of municipality i at time t,  is a vector of
unknown parameters to be estimated and Wit is a white noise distributed N
+
 
0; 2u

:As the cost
measure is usually specied in natural logs, the ine¢ciency term, uit, can be interpreted as the
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percentage deviation of observed performance from the municipalitys own frontier (at least for
small deviations).
Finally, we incorporate municipalities observed heterogeneity in the estimated distribution of in-
e¢ciency, specically in the mean of the distribution of ine¢ciency. Hence, following Kopsakangas-
Savolainen and Svento (2011), we can write:
zit = 0 + 1hit (17)
where hit is heterogeneity summarizing covariates explaining the mean of the ine¢ciency distri-
bution, zit, and 0 and 1 are new parameters to be estimated.
The model follows Battese and Coelli (1995) but applied to cost minimization. Their model
consider the joint maximization of equations (15) and (16) by maximum likelihood (ML). The esti-
mated parameters should be replaced in equation (15) obtaining the estimated variables presented
in equations (11) and (12). Then these variables are used in equation (14) to estimate munici-
pal ine¢ciency. Our approach to take into account municipalities observed heterogeneity follows
Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento (2011), incorporating such specic e¤ects in the mean of the
distribution of ine¢ciency (17).
5 Data and Summary Statistics
The data for this study comes from the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM ). This
system is a management tool which consolidate a group of variables and statistical data of munic-
ipalities. SINIM is updated once a year and has information of all 345 municipalities in Chile
from 2001 to 2019. For this study we use data for 2008-2018, that consist of a balanced panel that
includes 324 municipalities for these eleven years, which gives a total of: 3,564 observations10 . The
reason for this is that for some of the variables needed to carry out the analysis there are some
missing entries. The main sources of information for SINIM are municipalities (40% of the infor-
mation) and ministries or other public services (60%). SINIM is the main source of information for
municipal issues as it includes information on management, nance, human resources and municipal
characterization.
For our analysis we use output and input variables as well as determinants. We now explain
which variables were included in each of these categories.
5.1 Output Variables
Due to the inherent di¢culties to quantify the output provided by municipalities, we propose a
number of proxy variables. These variables consider the multiple functions assigned to municipalities
and capture the results obtained in all areas in which they deliver goods and services. After the
revision of the empirical literature and given the data available in the Chilean context we included
in the analysis the output variables described below and whose summary statistics are described in
Table 3. It should be noted that all of our monetary data are in 2018 Chilean pesos.
10There are variables that are not available for some specic years and municipalities, so the number of observations
varies a little in some estimations. We report this number in all of our regression analysis.
5.1.1 Education
One of the main services provided by municipalities is education. Municipalities provide education
throughout municipal, public, schools. To measure the amount of education provided we use 2
variables:
a. number of rural and urban municipal education establishments and
b. average monthly enrollment municipal education establishment.
5.1.2 Health
This is another of the most important services provided by municipalities. To capture the amount
of health services provided we use the number of health centres operating within each municipality.
Specically, we consider the following types of health centers:
a. Number of Centers for Mental Health (COSAM in Spanish)
b. Number of Health Laboratories
c. Number of General Rural Clinics
d. Number of General Urban Clinics
e. Number of Rural Health Posts
f. Number of Other Municipal Health Facilities in the Commune
g. Number of Emergency Primary Care Services (SAPU in Spanish)
5.1.3 Urbanism
Another function of municipalities is to provide roads and places of recreation such as parks, squares,
etc. To measure the services provided in this area we include the variable: square meters of
maintained green areas.
5.1.4 Hygiene
Municipalities are in charge of basic services in order to promote wellbeing. In order to have a
measure of the amount of services provided in this item we use two variables:
a. City cleaning services, garbage collection and landll services: corresponds to a municipal
expense and refers to the expense accrued by city cleaning services, garbage collection and landll
services (includes all areas of internal management and community services).
b. Drinking Water Coverage.
5.1.5 Social Services
We consider services provided to social organizations which have municipal promotion and funding
such as sport clubs, municipal services, elderly clubs, etc. To measure the amount of this kind
of services we include the variable social organization which register all social organizations by
municipality. Specically, we consider the following types of Community Organizations:
a. Sports Clubs
b. Mothers Centers
c. Older Adult Organizations
d. Parent Centers
e. Neighborhood Councils
f. Functional Community Organizations
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g. Community organizations with legal status in the commune
h. Community Unions.
5.2 Input Variables
After the denition of the output variables we dene the nancial resources used for the provision
of public services such as those presented above. Previous literature use current (i.e. operational)
expenditure as input. The reason for this is because capital expenditure is highly volatile. We
follow the same approach as in the Chilean case capital expenditure is also volatile. Additionally,
current expenditure represents more than 75% of total expenditure, hence we are including most
of its main components. Given this, we have two alternatives: (a) use total current expenditure
or (b) use current expenditure of those services provided. The di¤erences between the two is that
the former also includes expenditure on items that are not easily or directly attributed to some
particular output. For this reason we choose to use as input the current expenditure of those
services provided (i.e. expenditure in: employees, consumption of good and services and transfers
for education and health).
Specically, as input variables, we use the current expenditure as dened by the Chilean public
nance accounting system, which includes the following items:
a. Expenditure on Personnel
b. Consumer Goods and Services
c. Expenditure on Education: transfers to Private Legal Entities11
d. Expenditure on Health: transfers to Private Legal Entities12
e. Transfers to Health Services
f. Transfers to public Education Schools
g. Transfers to public Health centers.
5.3 Determinants of Municipal E¢ciency
To measure the e¤ect of demographic, economic and scal factors on ine¢ciency, the model must
incorporate some exogenous variables that may be considered relevant for municipal performance.
Determinants can represent direct e¤ects on municipal e¢ciency or discretionary inputs or un-
observable outputs. Discretionary inputs refer to production in a favorable environment while
unobservable outputs indicate service quality (as the included output variable in the model above
do not measure quality but quantity).
Determinants can have several e¤ects on ine¢ciency, thus it is complex to identify the limits
of the e¤ect of each determinant. Previous literature on the determinants of municipal ine¢ciency
use similar variables for this purpose and for estimating ine¢ciency. Particularly, these are the
variables we use to estimate the determinants of ine¢ciency:
5.3.1 Population
The hypothesis is that the bigger the population the bigger are the economics of scale and hence
such municipalities could reach higher levels of e¢ciency on the provision of goods and services. To
control by this determinant we use the following variables:
11Articule 13, Executive Order No 1, 3063/1980.
12Articule 13, Executive Order No 1, 3063/1980.
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a. Municipality population
b. Dummies for municipality population: We include dummy variables for three categories:
- Population under 10,000 inhabitants
- Population between 10.000 and 30.000 inhabitants
- Population over 100,000.
5.3.2 Geography
As Stastna and Gregor (2011) pointed out, the hypothesis is that the closer the geographic distance
between the municipality and the regional centre the more intense will be the competition between
them and at the same time access to regional public services gets easier. For these reasons we
should observe that closer municipalities relative to the regional centre would be more e¢cient. To
capture this we include a variable that measures:
a. Distance to the Regional Capital.
5.3.3 Fiscal Capacity
A lower scal capacity of municipalities implies a tighter budget constraint reducing the operational
surplus, which may a¤ect municipal e¢ciency. To measure this e¤ect we use four variables aimed
at measuring budgetary tightness:
a. Dependency from the common municipal fund (FCM) relative to self-generated income,
b. Percentage of public investment relative to total expenditure,
c. Current transfers from public institutions, where the latter is in per capita terms.
5.3.4 Political Factors
Political characteristics of a municipality may a¤ect e¢ciency in an important way. The hypothesis
is that a high level of political concentration is associated to a lower e¢ciency because of lack of
political competition (Besley et al, 2005). To measure this we use two variables:
a. A Herndahl index to capture the monopolistic degree of the City council13 This index
measures the concentration of political parties in the city council and is dened as follows: HHI =P City Councillors Political Party i
Total Number of City Councillorsx100
2
. It transpires that if the index is greater than 2500 it means
that one single party concentrates the greatest number of total councillors that a municipality can
have, for example, if the councillors are 8, there is a party that has 3 positions or there are two
parties that have 2 positions each.
b. The percentage of the council who belongs to the governmental coalition: officialism =
City Councillors from Mayors Political Party
Total Number of City Councillors + Major

, where Total Number of City Councillors is the sum of the
councillors and the mayor. For example, if this variable has the value 0.6, it means that 60% of the
council is composed of people who are part of the mayors party.
5.3.5 Observed Heterogeneity Variables
As we are including the exogenous determinants into the mean of the ine¢ciency term (see Bat-
tese and Coelli, 1995), in order to take into account municipalities observed heterogeneity in our
13This index was constructed using the seats of each political party in the Council.
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stochastic frontier model, we also incorporate such specic e¤ects in the estimated distribution of
ine¢ciency (see Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento, 2011).
a. Population density per square kilometer.
b. Urban: it is a dummy that takes value 1 when the commune has an urban population greater
than a rural population. For the period 2012-2017 the information of urban and rural population
was not for the communes, so it was assumed that if the commune was urban in 2011 it would also
be in 2012 and so on. This assumption is valid, since the population composition in terms of urban
or rural is not something that changes substantially from time to time.
c. Municipal Territorial Tax: This is tax imposed to agricultural and non-agricultural land.
d. Political Administrative Hierarchy: This variable is constructed by assigning the value 1 to
the communes that fulll the condition of being regional capitals. Then, it is multiplied by the
percentage of the population of the region, in relation to the total country. In the same way, a
value of 0.5 is assigned to those that fulll the condition of provincial capital, and this value is
multiplied by the total population of the Province, in relation to the total country. Finally, a value
of 0 is assigned to the other communes.
e. Income from Municipal Commercial Rights.
f. Percentage of Population living in Poverty Conditions within the municipality, according
to the National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey (In Spanish, Encuesta de Caracterización
Socioeconómica Nacional,CASEN ).
Clearly, a large number of individuals living below the poverty line puts an important pressure
on the provision of essential good and services aimed at improving the quality of life of that sector
of the population. In addition, a municipality with an important proportion of poor population will
probably have lower self-generated revenues coming from territorial taxes, commercial rights and
transport taxes, for example. These e¤ects plausible hypothesis to explain this result is that current
expenditure that go below some threshold may prevent local governments to provide municipal
goods and services in an e¢cient way.
6 Results
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood using the R-Project programme. This software
uses the parametrization of Battese and Corra (1977) which gives  =
2
u
2
instead of  =
2
u
2
v
.
By replacing 2 = 2v + 
2
u we obtain  =
2
u
2
v
+2
u
, which has a value in the range (0-1). The
software allows us to test the signicance of the parameter  in order to evaluate the existence of
ine¢ciency.14 In this way, if the null hypothesis  = 0 is not rejected, implies that 2u = 0 and then
the term u should be dropped from the model allowing the estimation by OLS.
6.1 General Results
Our preferred general model uses the current expenditure on selected services as input variable.
The output variables include the average monthly enrollment municipal education establishment,
the number of rural and urban municipal education establishments, the number of health centers,
14The generalized statistic LR, , is dened as:  =  2ln(
L(H0)
L(H1)
), where H0 and H1 are the null and the alternative
hypothesis respectively.If H0 is true then  asymptoticaly distributes as chi-squared. If H0 includes  = 0 (as in our
case), then  distributes as a combined chi-squared. The critical values for this test were obtained from Table 1 of
Kodde and Pam (1986).
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municipal expenditure on city cleaning services, garbage collection and landll services, square me-
ters of maintained green areas and social organizations. The determinants of municipal e¢ciency
include dummy variables for population under 10,000 inhabitants (Population Dummy 2), between
10.000 and 30.000 inhabitants (Population Dummy 3) and over 100,000 (Population Dummy 4),
distance to the regional capital, dependency from the common municipal fund (FCM) relative to
self-generated income, percentage of public investment relative to total expenditure, current trans-
fers from public institutions in per capita terms, the Herndahl index measuring the concentration
of political parties in the city council, and the percentage of the council who belongs to the govern-
mental coalition.
From the results of the general model presented in column1 of Table 4 it can be seen that
most of the determinants are signicant at 1% with the exception of the variable "Current transfers
from public institutions" that is signicant at 5% and the political factor variables, which are not
signicant at all.
6.1.1 Population
Results from Table 4 show that population variables: population dummy 2, population dummy
3 and population dummy 4 are all signicant at 1%. While population under 10,000 inhabitants
(Population Dummy 2) and between 10.000 and 30.000 inhabitants (Population Dummy 3) have a
negative impact on municipal e¢ciency levels, municipalities with populations over 100,000 (Pop-
ulation Dummy 4) do have a positive e¤ect on e¢ciency. This suggests that large municipalities,
with populations over 100,000 inhabitants, are more e¢cient than smaller municipalities.
An hypothesis to explain this result is that small municipalities face some di¢culties to provide
a minimum of goods and services due to their lack of economics of scale and scope and moral hazard.
As there are negative correlations between the dependency level of the FCM and population (see
Table 8), a municipality with a smaller population will have higher dependency of the FCM and
lower self-generated income which may su¤er of moral hazard induced behavior as resources are
not generated by the municipality but transferred from others regardless of municipal nancial
performance. This hypothesis is sometimes also referred as scal laziness in local governments.
6.1.2 Geography
Results from Table 4 suggest that the variable: "Distance to the Regional Capital" is negative
and statistically signicant at 1%. This results gives support to the hypothesis that the closer
municipalities are to the regional centre the more e¢cient they are. The rationale behind this result
is that being closer to the regional capital allows municipalities to compete for better resources,
nancial as well as for best qualied human capital, and at the same time access to get an easier
access to regional public services.
6.1.3 Fiscal Capacity
Table 4 shows that variables: "% common municipal fund (FCM ) to self-generated income" and
"% public investment to total expenditure" have negative coe¢cients and are both signicant at 1%.
Municipalities have a lower scal capacity whenever the dependency of the FCM relative to their
self-generated revenues increases. This lower scal capacity generate a tighter budget constraint,
decreasing in this way current expenditure. Similarly, whenever the percentage of investment over
total expenditure increases, municipalities will have a tighter budget constraint since they will
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face a lower current expenditure. A plausible hypothesis to explain this result is that current
expenditure that goes below some threshold may prevent local governments to provide municipal
goods and services in an e¢cient way. In addition, another explanation that could be put forward
is that a municipality with greater dependency on the FCM and lower self-generated income may
induce moral hazard as resources are not generated by the municipality but transferred from others
regardless of municipal nancial performance.
By contrast, the variable: "Current transfers from public institutions" has a positive coe¢-
cient, being statistically signicant at the 5%. An explanation for this result is that higher current
transfers from public institutions may improve municipal scal capacity, increasing their current ex-
penditure, and as these transfers are followed and monitored by these institutions (such as ministries
or other public services from the central government) and specically directed to the provision of
certain municipal goods and services, local governments tend to comply with scal discipline criteria
and with quality and timing standards associated to these transfers.
6.1.4 Political Factors
Table 4 shows that the variable: "Herndahl Index", that measures the concentration of political
parties in the city council, is zero and not statistically signicant, while "% Governmental Coalition
seats", that measures the percentage of the council who belongs to the governmental coalition,
is positive and not statistically signicant. While the main hypothesis behind the later is the
importance of political competition to improve municipal e¢ciency (Besley et al, 2005), this result,
although not statistically signicant, can point towards more coordination and governmentally given
by the majority of city councillors belonging to the same political trend.
6.1.5 Trend
From Table 3, it is easy to realize that some of the economic variables used in this study have
a common tendency of growing over time. Hence, we recognize the need to incorporate a time
trend in order to draw causal inference using our time series data. Ignoring the fact that two (or
more) sequences are trending in the same or opposite directions can lead us to falsely conclude
that changes in one variable are actually caused by changes in another variable. In many cases,
two time series processes appear to be correlated only because they are both trending over time for
reasons related to other unobserved factors. For this reason we include the variable: "Trend" that
runs from one in 2008 to eleven in 2018. Table 4 shows that "Trend" is positive and statistically
signicant at 5%, reecting the fact that indeed many of the time series data we use in our study
have a tendency of growing over time. This is not surprise as we use data from local government
budgets which usually grow in time.
6.1.6 Observed Heterogeneity Variables
In Table 4 we also report results regarding the inclusion of variables to account for municipalities
observed heterogeneity.
a. Poverty: The variable: "% Poverty", that represents the percentage of population living in
poverty conditions within the municipality, is negative, very close to zero, and not statistically
signicant.
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b. Political Administrative Hierarchy: The variable: "Administrative hierarchy" is positive,
close to 1, and statistically signicant at 1%. This result suggests that municipalities that are
also regional or provincial capitals, with big populations are more e¢cient than those that are
not. We can explain this result by the fact that Chile is a very centralized country, in which the
capital Santiago concentrates 36% of the countrys population and where regional and provincial
capitals are also the more populated areas in regions, and so they tend to concentrate most of the
advance human capital, more developed infrastructure, industry and markets. Hence, it transpires,
that given this level of centralization, regional or provincial capitals are favored with better and
more resources and therefore are more e¢cient than other local governments that do not share this
characteristic.
c. Municipal Territorial Tax: "Territorial Tax" is a tax imposed to agricultural and non-
agricultural land within the commune. This variable is positive and statistically signicant at
5%. This result implies that the most money a municipality collect due to this tax, the more
e¢cient the local government is. This nding is consistent with the negative sign and signicance
of the variable "% common municipal fund (FCM ) to self-generated income" discussed previously,
since territorial tax is one of the most important sources of self-generated income for Chilean local
governments. Again, an explanation for this could be the fact that pro-active local governments that
try to generate their own income, take better care of those resources than those municipalities that
receive most of their revenues from the common municipal fund. In other words, local governments
with greater levels of self-generated income may reduce the incentives for moral hazard behavior as
resources are generated by the own municipality and so their results are aligned with their nancial
performance.
d. Municipal Commercial Rights: The variable: "Mun. Commercial Rights" is positive and
statistically signicant at 1%. This rationale of this result is similar to the one presented for the case
of the "Territorial Tax" variable, since is also one of the most important sources of self-generated
income for Chilean local governments.
Finally, from our analysis, it can be concluded that our general model is very robust to the in-
clusion of variables used in order to account for municipalities observed heterogeneity. Indeed, from
Table 4 it transpires that the signs and statistically signicance of the variables from our General
Model are not a¤ected by the inclusion of these variables, even when we estimate our General
Model including all the Heterogeneity Variables. It should be noted that when all the heterogeneity
variables were added, the variables "Herndhal Index" and "% Governmental Coalition seats" were
dropped as the model was losing specicity by having so many determinants.
7 Overall results
Regarding the overall results, Table 4 suggests that Chilean municipalities have a signicantly
di¤erent from zero degree of ine¢ciency (i.e. the LR test H0 : 
2
u = 0; rejects the null). In
particular, Table 5 shows that the aggregate ine¢ciency estimated by our General Model reaches
61%. This result suggests that Chilean municipalities could provide the same amount of services
but with a 61% less of resources. Again the results are very robust to the incorporation of covariates
to control for municipalities observed heterogeneity such as: %Poverty, "Administrative hierarchy",
"Territorial Tax", and "Mun. Commercial Rights". The di¤erent estimates of aggregate ine¢ciency
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go from 61% to 59,10%, which results from adding the variable "Mun. Commercial Rights" to the
determinants. When all heterogeneity variables are added to the General model, the estimated
aggregate ine¢ciency is reduced to 52,9%. From Table 5, it can also be noted that the standard
deviation of average e¢ciency is, for all estimations, very close to 50%, which implies that the
e¢ciency levels of the 324 local governments under analysis are spread out over a large range of
values, as also noted by the maximum and minimum values.
Table 6 reports the evolution of average e¢ciency for the period 2008-2018. The histogram
presented in Figure 1 shows an approximate representation of the distribution of average e¢ciency
levels for all the local governments in the sample for years 2008, 2013 and 2018. From this graph, it
transpires that in 2008 there was an important number of municipalities with e¢ciency levels above
70%, in fact that year the average e¢ciency level for all local governments was around 63%. By 2013,
only a few number of municipalities showed e¢ciency levels above 75%, being the average e¢ciency
level 38% that year. Finally, in 2018 this trend shows that most local governments present e¢ciency
levels below 50%, being the average e¢ciency level 22% that year. Finally, Figure 2 shows that,
consequently, the levels of aggregated ine¢ciency have sharply risen during this period, from 37,5%
to 78,4%, being the average aggregate ine¢ciency for the period the 61% already reported.
8 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check the sensitivity of our results we modify some of the assumptions.
8.1 Multicollinearity
In the rst place we check the correlations between the variables. This is important as the Translog
function used for our analysis may be susceptible of multicollinearity and degrees of freedom prob-
lems. Hence, in order to check the level of multicollinearity of the output variables included in the
model, we analyze the correlation between them and the results are presented in Table 7. Results
suggest that levels of correlation are not very high. Furthermore, we repeat the same exercise with
the determinants. Results are presented in Table 8 and suggest that correlations between them
are not high at all.
8.2 Alternative Costs Function
All the analysis was carried out using a Translog cost function which gives exibility and relax
some of the assumptions of the more commonly used Cobb-Douglas. Even though Greene (2005c)
pointed out that results are overall similar irrespective of the function, we now check how our results
change when we vary the cost function. For this, we re estimate the baseline general model but now
using the more restrictive Cobb-Douglas instead of the Translog. Results are presented in Table
9 and suggest that the overall results are indeed similar (rankings of municipalities are similar as
well).
8.3 Alternative denition of inputs
As current expenditure on the services included in our model was used as input for our estimations,
we now check the sensitivity of our results to a slight modication of the input variable. We
reestimate the model but now using total current expenditure. In this way we are considering all
21
the current resources used by municipalities on the provision of good and services. From Table 10
we observe that results are similar when input variable is slightly modied.
8.4 Unobservable Heterogeneity
As previously pointed out, parametric methods can take into account unobserved heterogeneity in
explaining municipal performance. As a random e¤ect approach is used in this study, an assumption
is implicitly imposed. This relates to the assumption that there is no correlation between the covari-
ates and the composed error term. As in the error term unobserved heterogeneity is included, this
is included in our assumption. As in the municipal case, it could be questionable that unobserved
heterogeneity is not correlated with the covariates, we relax the assumption by using Mundlaks
(1978) approach. This approach consist on parameterizing the unobserved heterogeneity with the
average (across time) of the time variables covariates. Results with the Mundlak parametrization
are shown in Table 11 and suggest that there are no signicant di¤erences relative the original
model without Mundlaks parametrization.
8.5 Quality
As previously stated, we did not include quality measures in our determinants and thus the general
model focuses in quantity of services provided. Despite this, we indirectly take educational quality
into account by incorporating as output within our General Model the following two variables:
a. The average scores of the Education Quality Measurement System (in Spanish: Sistema
de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación, SIMCE ) of 4th grade for language and mathematics
subjects, per municipality.
b. The percentage of municipal education establishments that obtain, on average, a score equal
to or higher than 450 points in the University Selection Test (in Spanish: Prueba de Selección
Universitaria,PSU ) per municipality.
Similarly, in order to measure quality in Health we also incorporated to our General Model the
following variable:
a. Infant mortality rate at the municipal level. This rate is the number of deaths per 1,000 live
births of children under one year of age by municipality.
In order to further investigate this issue, we reestimate the general model but now controlling
by our quality variables in education and health. Results are presented in Table 12 and suggest
that the e¤ects of quality in education and health are not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
9 Concluding Remarks & Policy Recommendations
This study estimates a stochastic frontier model in order to analyze municipal e¢ciency and its
determinants. To estimate the model, unlike most of previous literature, we use panel data from
2008-2018 of 324 Chilean Municipalities and a one stage approach in order to avoid the problems
from the two stages approach. We take into account observed and unobserved heterogeneity, in-
corporating them both into the frontier and jointly estimating e¢ciency of all the municipalities in
the sample.
Our results suggest that Chilean municipalities present on average ine¢ciency levels of 61%
approximately for the period 2008-2018. In other words, Chilean municipalities could provide the
same amount of services but with a 61% less of resources. We also report the evolution of average
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e¢ciency for the period 2008-2018 showing that the levels of aggregated ine¢ciency have sharply
risen during this period, from 37.5% to 78.4%.
In particular, we found that large municipalities, with populations over 100,000 inhabitants,
are more e¢cient than smaller municipalities and that the closer municipalities are to the regional
centers the more e¢cient they are. We also report that regional or provincial capitals are more
e¢cient on average than the rest. All these ndings seem to point to Chiles uneven population
distribution and the extremely centralized political organization of Chilean regions as key factors
of municipalities e¢ciency levels. Indeed, Chile is a very centralized country, in which the capital
Santiago concentrates 36% of the countrys population and where regional and provincial capitals are
also the more populated areas in regions, and so they tend to concentrate most of the advance human
capital, more developed infrastructure, industry and markets. Hence, it transpires, that given this
level of centralization, regional or provincial capitals are favored with better and more resources
and therefore are more e¢cient than other local governments that do not share this characteristic.
Clearly, in order to address these issues structural changes are need it. This issue has been recently
recognized by Chilean politicians and in February 2018, two laws were enacted regarding Chiles
decentralization: Law No. 21,073, which regulates the election of regional governors and other
aspects, and Law No. 21,074, on Strengthening the Countrys Regionalization, which will have
important consequences for public management. These two laws will introduce signicant changes
to the decentralization model. Specically, the biggest change will be reected in October 2020,
when regional governors will be elected by direct vote, replacing the current mayors. In addition,
the mechanism for transferring powers from the central government to the regional governments
will be implemented from 2022 onwards. The results presented in this paper support the need to
implement these two laws on Chiles decentralization.
Furthermore, we also found evidence that municipalities with a high dependency on the Munic-
ipal Common Fund (as percentage to self-generated income) and with a high percentage of public
investment with respect to total expenditure are, ceteris paribus, less e¢cient. We argue that this
result can point towards the notion that municipalities with lower self-generated income may su¤er
of moral hazard induced behavior as resources are not generated by them but transferred from oth-
ers regardless of municipal nancial performance. If local governments nancial resources are not
tied to their performance in any way, they do not have economic incentives to either take good care
of their e¢cient use nor to generate new revenue sources. This notion is sometimes also referred as
local governments scal laziness in the literature. This is probably one of the main explanations
of the sharp risen in local governments levels of aggregated ine¢ciency for the period 2008-2018
(from 37.5% to 78.4%). In fact, several Laws improving public health and education have been
passed in recent years, which mainly increase the salaries of municipal employees in those sectors,
without incorporating incentives to improve the e¢ciency of the provision of municipalities services.
In other words, the municipal production costs importantly increased during this period without
implying a corresponding inrease in output.
By contrast, we found that local governments with higher self-generated revenues coming from
higher territorial taxes collected or higher municipal commercial rights are more e¢cient. Finally,
we also report that current transfers from public institutions (namely, Ministries and other public
services) to municipalities also increase e¢ciency, which provides an interesting policy recommen-
dation for the Chilean Central Government to implement in the future regarding local government
development.
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Table No1: Sources of Funding of the FCM
Structure of FCM Municipal Contribution Contribution from the
wealthiest Municipalities*
Territorial Tax 60% 65%
Commercial Rights 0% 55% Santiago and 65% Providencia,
Las Condes and Vitacura
Transport Tax 62.5% 62.5%
Vehicles Transfers 50% 50%
Penalties and Fines 100% 100%
Central Government Transfers 218,000 UTM 218,000 UTM
*Santiago, Providencia, Las Condes and Vitacura
Table No2: Mechanism of Distribution of the FCM
Indicator Percentage
same proportion 25%
Poverty 10%
Exempted Land 30%
Permanent Self-generated Revenue (IPP) 35%
Total 100%
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Table No 4: Results for the General Model and controlling for Heterogeneity
Determinants General + % Poverty + Admin. + Territ. + M. Comm +Heterog
Model Hierarchy Tax Rights Variables
Constant 1.007*** 1.033*** 1.024*** 0.810*** 0.363** -1.056***
Population Dummy 2 -0.298*** -0.301*** -0.320*** -0.292*** -0.281*** -0.269***
Population Dummy 3 -0.242*** -0.241*** -0.255*** -0.241*** -0.235*** -0.231***
Population Dummy 4 0.446*** 0.442*** 0.450*** 0.446*** 0.445*** 0.436***
Distance to Regional Capital -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.042***
% CMF to self-generated income -0.691*** -0.683*** -0.669*** -0.645*** -0.521*** -0.168***
% public investment to total exp. -0.540*** -0.544*** -0.533*** -0.535*** -0.538*** -0.500***
Current transfers from public inst. 0.039** 0.035** 0.036** 0.046*** 0.047** 0.068***
Herndhal Index 0 0 0 0 0
% Governmental Coalition seats 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.024 0.033
%¨Poverty -0.069 0.011
Administrative hierarchy 0.933*** 0.969 ***
Territorial Tax 0.011** 0.027***
Mun. Commercial Rights 0.039*** 0.098 ***
Trend 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.085***
2 0.552*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.086***
 0.073*** 0.597*** 0.542*** 0.523*** 0.399** 0.0004***
LR test on 2u = 0 -333.35*** -328.28*** -315.13*** -328.98*** -310.09*** -247.52***
Number of Observations 3,474*** 3,463 3,474 3,474 3,474 3,463
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
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Table No 5: Average E¢ciency for the General Model and controlling for Hetero-
geneity
Model Avarage Standard Maximum Minimum
E¢ciency Deviation
General Model 0.390 0.200 0.958 0.050
General Model + % Poverty 0.390 0.200 0.962 0.049
General Model + Administrative hierarchy 0.384 0.198 0.957 0.042
General Model + Territorial Tax 0.392 0.202 0.957 0.051
General Model + Mun. Commercial Rights 0.409 0.212 0.965 0.053
General Model + Heterogeneity Variables 0.471 0.257 0.999 0.035
Table No 6: Evolution of Average E¢ciency for the Period 2008-2018
Year Average Standard Maximum Minimum
E¢ciency Deviation
2008 0.625 0.22 0.959 0.124
2009 0.568 0.205 0.938 0.112
2010 0.528 0.188 0.881 0.103
2011 0.463 0.167 0.856 0.089
2012 0.418 0.153 0.803 0.088
2013 0.375 0.142 0.775 0.079
2014 0.326 0.124 0.638 0.072
2015 0.293 0.111 0.553 0.068
2016 0.258 0.096 0.473 0.062
2017 0.236 0.086 0.474 0.056
2018 0.216 0.08 0.438 0.051
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Table No 7: Multicollinearity of Output Variables
Output v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
Variables
Average Monthly Student Enrollment (v1) 1
Number of Education Establishments (v2) 0.59 1
Number of Health Centers (v3) 0.50 0.56 1
Exp. on Cleaning Services & Garbage Collection ( v4) 0.66 0.33 0.27 1
Square meters of Green Areas (v5) 0.56 0.32 0.29 0.62 1
Drinking Water Coverage (v6) 0.45 0.13 0.06 0.42 0.33 1
Social Organizations (v7) 0.52 0.41 0.34 0.43 0.35 0.29 1
Table No 8: Multicollinearity of Determinants
Determinant v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
Variables
Population (v1) 1
Distance to Regional Capital (ln Km) (v2) -0.18 1
% Common Municipal Fund to self-generated income (v3) -0.41 0.23 1
% Public Investment to Total Expenditure ( v4) -0.29 0.12 0.28 1
Current Transfers from Public Institutions (v5) 0.76 -0.16 -0.40 -0.30 1
Herndhal Index (v6) -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.16 0.18 1
% Governmental Coalition seats (v7) 0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.1 1
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Table No9: Alternative Costs Functions
Determinants Translog Cobb-Douglas
Constant 1.007*** 1.803***
Population Dummy 2 -0.298*** -0.653***
Population Dummy 3 -0.242*** -0.508***
Population Dummy 4 0.446*** 0.791***
Distance to Regional Capital (ln Km) -0.042*** -0.063***
% common municipal fund (FCM) to self-generated income -0.691*** -0.959***
% public investment to total expenditure -0.540*** -0.697***
Current transfers from public institutions 0.039** -0.018
Herndhal Index 0 0
% Governmental Coalition seats 0.029 0.035
Trend 0.103*** 0.130***
2 0.552*** 0.106***
 0.073*** 0.661***
LR test on 2u = 0 -333.35*** -927***
Number of Observations 3,474 3,474
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
Table No10: Alternative Input variable
Determinants Current Total Current
Expenditure Expenditure
Constant 1.007*** 0.865***
Population Dummy 2 -0.298*** -0.258***
Population Dummy 3 -0.242*** -0.223***
Population Dummy 4 0.446*** 0.448***
Distance to Regional Capital (ln Km) -0.042*** -0.043***
% common municipal fund (FCM) to self-generated income -0.691*** -0.695***
% public investment to total expenditure -0.540*** -0.533***
Current transfers from public institutions 0.039** 0.054**
Herndhal Index 0 0
% Governmental Coalition seats 0.029 0.046*
Trend 0.103*** 0.106***
2 0.552*** 0.649***
 0.073*** 0.078***
LR test on 2u = 0 -333.35*** 422.54***
Number of Observations 3,474 3,474
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
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Table No11: Parametrization of Unobserved Heterogeneity (Mundlack)
Determinants Random Random E¤ect
E¤ect + Mundlak
Population Dummy 2 -0.298*** -0.190***
Population Dummy 3 -0.242*** -0.120***
Population Dummy 4 0.446*** 0.244***
Distance to Regional Capital (ln Km) -0.042*** -0.025***
% common municipal fund (FCM) to self-generated income -0.691*** -0.609***
% public investment to total expenditure -0.540*** -0.489***
Current transfers from public institutions 0.039** 0.103***
Herndhal Index 0.000 0.000
% Governmental Coalition seats 0.029 -0.007
Trend 0.103*** 0.114***
2 0.552*** 0.055***
 0.073*** 0.404***
LR test on 2u = 0 -333.35*** 99.31***
Number of Observations 3,474 3,474
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
Table No12: Introducing Quality
Determinants General + Quality + Quality
Model in Education in Health
Constant 1.007*** 1.030**** 1.021***
Population Dummy 2 -0.298*** -0.290*** -0.295***
Population Dummy 3 -0.242*** -0.234*** -0.239***
Population Dummy 4 0.446*** 0.432*** 0.438***
Distance to Regional Capital (ln Km) -0.042*** -0.040*** -0.042***
% common municipal fund (FCM) to self-generated income -0.691*** -0.660*** -0.686***
% public investment to total expenditure -0.540*** -0.553*** -0.539***
Current transfers from public institutions 0.039** 0.035** 0.038**
Herndhal Index 0 0 0
% Governmental Coalition seats 0.029 0.02 0.026
Trend 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.102***
2 0.552*** 0.546*** 0.509***
 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.072***
LR test on 2u = 0 -333.35*** 270.44*** 320.17***
Number of Observations 3,474 3,467 3,474
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
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Figure No1: Histogram of Ine¢ciency
Figure No2: Aggregated Estimated Ine¢ciency (%), 2008-2018
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